Nor does the mere enumeration in one statute of certain provisions in another as not to be affected by it warrant an inference that all other existing provisions on the subject, not referred to in the enumerations, are repealed. Endlich, supra, Par. 398 at page 558.
The statute establishing the term of Court at Lewisburg is identical with that establishing the several terms of court in New Jersey. The interpretation of the New Jersey statute by the Court in United States v. Perlstein et al., D.C., 39 F.Supp. 965, affirmed, 3 Cir., 126 F.2d 789, applies with equal force to the present situation. See also Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 31 S. Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101, 21 Ann.Cas. 849.
I conclude, therefore, that the regular stated term of Court at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, which commenced on the third Monday of January, 1948, has not yet been terminated and will continue until the next stated term at Lewisburg, on the third Monday of January, 1949, unless in the meantime an order of adjournment sine die be entered or a special term be commenced at that place.
Defendants further claim that they cannot have a fair and impartial trail at Lewisburg by reason of hardship, unavailability of witnesses, considerable and unnecessary financial loss to themselves and their witnesses and the unavailability of facilities to enable the proper preparation for trial and for procedural matters during the trial. In support thereof they cite United States v. National City Lines, D.C., 7 F.R.D. 393. That case is clearly distinguishable as it involved the removal for trial of a case, the basis of which took place chiefly in Chicago, Illinois, from Chicago to the Southern District of California. Here we are concerned not only with the trial of a case within the district in which the offence is alleged to have been committed but also in which at least three of the four defendants live. If many of the reasons assigned for the removal of the trial of this case to Scranton were to prevail it would in effect be the equivalent of disqualifying Lewisburg as a seat of the Court. It would constitute a nullification of, and be directly in the face of, a specific Statutory designation that a term ' * * * of the district court shall be held * * * at Lewisburg on the third Monday in January;' with the further proviso in the Statute that 'The clerk of the court for the middle district shall maintain an office, in charge of himself or a deputy, at Lewisburg.'
As to the other reasons assigned, pertaining chiefly to the fact that three of the defendants reside at Scranton, Pennsylvania, which is approximately 90 miles from Lewisburg, it must be borne in mind that there are many places within the Middle District of Pennsylvania which are located a much greater distance from any statutory seat of holding court within the Middle District, and the same is true of many other districts. To hold that it would be an undue hardship would in my opinion be setting a dangerous precedent.
Nor finally will it, as contended, ' * * * deprive him of his Constitutional Right to a trial by a jury of the peers of his vicinage.'
The Constitution provides, Art. 3, Section 2, Clause 3: 'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; * * * .' (Emphasis supplied) Amendment VI: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, * * * .' (Emphasis supplied)
In support of this contention, defendants quote from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. An examination of the text, however, discloses in the footnotes that as to offenses against the United States the terms 'vicinage' and 'district' are synonymous.
The comment in 50 C.J.S.Juries, 8, page 721, is pertinent, that 'In this connection, the term 'vicinage,' while subject to various definitions depending on the sense in which it is used, has been held to refer to an area corresponding with the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which trial is had.'
I find nothing in this case which differentiates it or calls for any deviation from the procedure generally followed within the district.
Motion overruled and exception noted.