into camp, at about 11:30 corroborated by Partyka, * * * .'
Certainly, there are few records which when searched with a fine tooth comb will not yield some debatable rulings of law or admission of evidence and if this could be done in habeas corpus there would be no end to litigation and the time of the courts would be occupied in useless and futile speculation. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 429, 32 S. Ct. 753, 756, 56 L. Ed. 1147, that ' * * * The principle of the cases is the simple one that if a court has jurisdiction of the case, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to retry this issues, whether of law, constitutional or other, or of fact', is still a salutary rule. Certainly here the eight members of the trial court with the benefit of observation of the witnesses were in a better position than this court to arrive at the correct result. Moreover, on the record before us, there would be no inclination to disagree with the verdict at which they arrived. The trial record shows a careful impartial trial, and the Board of Review made an exhaustive and careful study of both the law and the facts of the trial.
We are next concerned with the usual allegation of competency of assigned counsel, the petitioner alleging that he did not have adequate representation. Military Law is due process of law to those in the military or naval service
and for proceedings before Courts-Martial a commissioned officer is competent counsel.
The special orders dated August 9, 1944, designating the members of the court in petitioner's case also appointed for him a defense counsel and assistant defense counsel.
In addition thereto, the Record
shows that Smith was given an opportunity to introduce civil or military counsel of his own selection and accordingly did introduce as Associate Counsel one 2nd Lt. Harry Lieberman, although electing to also retain the services of the appointed Defense Counsel and Assistant Defense Counsel.
Lieberman, the selected counsel, was a law school graduate with 10 years experience in the practice of law.
The appointed Assistant Counsel was ' * * * a graduate of Notre Dame Law School and admitted to practice in Washington.'
Whether or not the other appointed Counsel was an attorney does not appear. Whether any of the specific guarantees of the 5th and 6th amendments relating to criminal prosecutions apply to petitioner in military trial
need not be decided here since the remaining questions may be fully disposed of, giving the petitioner the benefit of the principles as applied to criminal prosecution in the Civil Courts. That he had counsel of his own choosing might well dispose of this question, but the reflection cast upon counsel, including appointed counsel calls for consideration. The burden of proving such incompetency is upon petitioner.
He has introduced no evidence other than the trial record and his own lay conclusion. Even had the record shown carelessness of counsel or a failure of counsel to object to the introduction of evidence, or errors in their advice, it would not rise to that plane where it would constitute a ground for habeas corpus.
Nor does the Constitution guarantee the assistance of the most brilliant counsel.
To entitle petitioner to relief on this ground there must be such a neglect of duty ' * * * as to make the trial itself 'offend those canons of decency' which constitute due process of law.',
or an extreme case which would make the proceedings 'a farce and a mockery of justice.'
Petitioner's counsel, with the benefit of having before him the typewritten copy of the entire testimony, and with an opportunity to carefully analyze the same, and with a knowledge of the very last witness's testimony, points out instances where he, had he been trying the case, would have put some additional questions to some of the witnesses, or objected to some of the testimony. Counsel in the actual trial of a case and with a background of information not appearing in the record, may well, in the exercise of good judgment, deem it wise to refrain from asking certain specific questions or refrain from objecting.
Moreover, an examination of the trial record convinces this Court that the petitioner was most ably, competently, and vigorously represented and defended
Petitioner alleges that the investigation under Article of War 70, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1542, was conducted in such a manner as to deprive the General Court-Martial of jurisdiction. Petitioner's position is that the requirements of Article of War 70 are all jurisdictional and any deviation would per se render any subsequent proceedings void.
It has been aptly said that 'It was no part of the purpose of the authors of Article of War 70 to prevent the trial, conviction and punishment of a guilty man.',
and Article of War 37, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1508,
as a guide for reviewing and confirming authorities provides as to Courts-Martial that errors complained of must have 'injuriously affected the substantial rights of an accused.'
Petitioner alleges that Lt. Todd was 'the originator of the charges and the accuser in fact,' and 'ineligible to be the impartial investigator under the 70th Article of War.'
The formal charges were preferred by Captain MacGregor, the accused's immediate Commanding Officer.
The attacks had been reported to the British Police and they had conducted a preliminary investigation and interviewed witnesses with the assistance of several agents assigned by the Criminal Investigation Division, U.S. Army.
Lt. Todd as Provost Marshal of the Army Base or 'Field', first knew about the matter between the 16th and 18th of July, when visited by two British Constables,
and made available to them the lists of names to locate soldiers who had been in that vicinity, including a 'fellow by the name of Smith.' He called in some suspects, including Smith, for interviews.
The British Constable examined Smith's hand for tooth marks.
Subsequently Lt. Todd participated in arranging a line-up of 14 soldiers to ascertain whether the girls identified any suspect, including Smith.
Whether Lt. Todd participated as Provost Marshal prior to or as investigator subsequent to his designation is immaterial. It was a proper part of an impartial investigation.
The Record shows that as Investigating Officer, Lt. Todd advised Smith of his rights, informed him of the statements of witnesses, called every witness Smith requested, permitted Smith to interrogate any witnesses he desired, and conducted a fair and impartial investigation under Article of War 70.
This was all that Smith had a right to ask. He was not deprived of any substantial right.
At the opening of the trial he was also given full opportunity to object to proceeding with the trial.
Petitioner contends that the line-up at which he was identified was unfairly conducted,
and that the British Constable at his interview had no right to look at his hand for tooth marks, and that these matters constituted compulsory self-incrimination.
Petitioner proceeds on the theory of an involuntary confession. The girls at the trial again positively identified him, and his hand was available for examination at the trial. Consequently, even though considered as an involuntary confession, it did not prevent such identification at the trial.
Nor is the question of the admission thereof at the trial a proper subject of habeas corpus.
Moreover, fundamentally, such identification or physical examination is not within the doctrine of self-crimination or involuntary confession.
Physical inspection 'does not call upon the accused as a witness, i.e. upon his testimonial responsibility.'
Petitioner further objects to the fact that a 'Mrs. Kerry' was not called as a witness, evidently under the theory of denial of compulsory process. The prosecution 'is not under duty to place upon the witness stand every person who may have some knowledge of the crime which is the subject of the trial.'
Nor is it bound to call any specific persons as witnesses,
and where application is to the Courts for compulsory process for witnesses to be produced as government expense, exercise of discretion by the trial court
which ordinarily would not be disturbed in a habeas corpus proceeding,
it must also appear that the witness if called would have been favorable to the accused.
This is true even where the question is raised on appeal as distinguished from a collateral proceeding.
The mere fact that a witness was not present or was not called is not in itself sufficient to constitute a denial of Compulsory Process.
Mrs. Kerry was with Miriam Cullum when Smith first accosted her. Petitioner contends she had made a statement in which she said 'If I were in Court I would identify him' and that such statement was offered in evidence by the prosecution but ruled out and stricken from the record.
The Court-Martial Record does not show this witness requested by Smith, and he admits that no request was made of the Trial Court.
Lt. Todd, confirming the Court-Martial Record, testified that he called every witness requested by Smith and he had a full opportunity to interrogate them.
As to Mrs. Kerry, Smith was fully aware that her name had appeared in the case, but he did not desire her as a witness.
Had he been so positive of his own innocence it would seem that he would have been eager to interview her. Not only, therefore, has he failed to present a question for consideration in habeas corpus but it is difficult to conceive how his rights as to witnesses could have been more carefully and fairly protected
With reference to petitioner's contention that we must assume that the Court was influenced thereby, it is sufficient to say that even if such a statement of Mrs. Kerry was offered and refused, we do not understand it to be the law that we must presume that the Court did not perform its duty
in disregarding it, just as it would have instructed a jury to do so.
The petition for the writ is accordingly denied and the rule to show cause dismissed.