with the price fixed by the Office of Price Administration.
The testimony offered on behalf of the plaintiff clearly reveals that it purchased the cast house considering the steel contained therein to be prefabricated steel, that is, steel which could be dismantled and re-erected. The defendant's agent considered it scrap steel, that is steel to be sent to a mill to be melted. The evidence was that scrap steel had a value of approximately $ 13 per gross ton, loaded on cars. It is inconceivable that the plaintiff would have paid $ 610 for the cast house when it could have sold the thirty-five tons of steel for only $ 455. This is rendered even more remote by the fact that plaintiff assumed the cost of demolition and, to obtain the price of $ 13 per ton, would have had to load the steel on trucks, remove it to a railroad siding, and reload it on cars. Under such circumstances, the testimony of Sogg, that if the steel were scrap, the best offer it could have made was to remove the cast house for the steel contained in it, without more, seems reasonable.
It should be noted that the transaction between the parties was at 'arms length,' and plaintiff owed defendant no duty of advising it of the value of the steel or the uses to which it could be put. Moreover, Appel testified he had a familiarity with property, and according to the record, he had the cast house appraised. It is contended by the defendant that Sogg told Appel the steel was scrap and therefore the plaintiff should be estopped to assert a higher value. However, without consideration of the merit of that argument I credit the testimony of Sogg that nothing was said, during the period of negotiations, about the kind of steel the cast house contained. I am convinced, further, that Sogg did not represent to Appel that the steel was scrap.
The Court is of the opinion that the market value of the steel contained in the cast house was $ 1925, exclusive of the costs of dismantling. Since the plaintiff has paid the full purchase price, it is entitled to recover the full market value. Also the plaintiff incurred expenses in the amount of $ 220.28 in the dismantling of the cast house. Since the parties contemplated the removal of the cast house, this expense constitutes a loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach. Plaintiff, therefore, should also recover that amount. See Rex Auto Exchange v. Hoffman, Inc., 1925, 84 Pa.Super. 369.
Accordingly, I state the following
Conclusions of Law
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this controversy.
2. Plaintiff, through its authorized agent, and defendant, through its authorized agent, entered into an agreement of sale of a cast house owned by the defendant.
3. Defendant's agent, within the scope of his authority, represented to the plaintiff's agent that he had settled and compromised all the tax liens outstanding against the subject of sale. Such representation constituted a warranty, and being untrue, was breached at the time it was made.
4. Plaintiff, having paid the full purchase price under the agreement of sale, is entitled to recover from the defendant the market value of the steel contained in the cast house, in the amount of $ 1925 and other expenses incurred as a direct and natural result of the breach, in the amount of $ 220.28, or a total of $ 2145.28.
An order may be entered in accordance herewith.