and no accompanying directives and regulations. The increase seems to have been duly completed at that time.
On the first day of August, however, the Office of Price Administration appeared in this Court, having been revived by the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, Public Law 548, 79th Congress, on July 25, 2946' 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq., and presented a complaint requesting the temporary restraining order above referred to.
Plaintiff's contention is that, since the Office of Price Administration was revitalized on the 25th of July, and defendant's rates did not become effective till August 1, 1946, plaintiff was entitled to thirty days notice before the new rates could become effective regardless of the fact that it was impossible for the defendant to notify him at the time of the application for the rate increase, and that the increase had already been authorized by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
Plaintiff cites as controlling the case of Henderson v. Washington, Marlboro & Annapolis Motor Lines, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 26, 132 F.2d 729, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 779, 63 S. Ct. 854, 87 L. Ed. 1147. In that case, the carrier filed a schedule of tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission nine days prior to approval of the Act (October 2, 1942), but which rates had not been put into operation because the thirty day waiting period, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., had not elapsed. The Court held that the increases effected thereby were not 'made' until the passage of the thirty day period and, therefore, the carrier came within the terms of the Act which reads: ' * * * No common carrier * * * shall make any general increase in its rates or charges which were in effect on September 15, 1942, * * * '. It was further held that the defendant failed to comply with the Act and that the increase was unlawful because the Office of Price Administration had not received the requisite thirty days notice.
This Court does not determine whether the increase in this case was 'made' at the time the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission permitted the increase which was prior to the resumption of the Office of Price Administration, or at the time the increase was to take effect, which was subsequent to the passage of the Price Control Extension Act. Section 18 of the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, supra, provides, inter alia, as follows: ' * * * Provided further, that no act or transaction, or omission or failure to act, occurring subsequent to June 30, 1946, and prior to the date of enactment of this Act, shall be deemed to be a violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, or the Stabilization Act of 1942, as amended, or of any regulation, order, price schedule, or requirement under either of such Acts: * * * .' It is the opinion of this Court that this provision was intended to apply to situations such as this. The original act under which the Henderson case, supra, was decided contained no similar provision. If the plaintiff were to succeed in his contentions, it would have the effect of positively banning any rate increase for any utility through the months of July and August, 1946, regardless of the justification therefor. The purpose of the Act was not to establish the Office of Price Administration as a rate fixing agency for public utilities, and if the Court were to grant the requested restraining order, it would have the effect of fixing all rates for public utilities in Pennsylvania for a short period of time, because of that Office's ability to prevent a change, though one had already been granted by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
The Court does not feel that there is any necessity in this case for the granting of a temporary restraining order, and it does feel that the granting of such an order might result in great injustice.
The plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.
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