new trial on the sole ground that the verdict of the jury was highly excessive because (1) the amount awarded far surpasses reasonable compensation for plaintiff's loss of earnings, expenses, pain and suffering; and, (2) because the jury failed to give any consideration to that portion of the charge wherein the jury was instructed that if their findings should be in favor of the plaintiff, they should reduce the amount of their award in proportion to the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In addition to plaintiff's injuries, his present, past and anticipatory pain and suffering both in mind and body, the testimony shows his loss of earnings to date to be Sixteen Hundred ($ 1600) Dollars, and his medical bills to date to be approximately Three hundred, Sixty Five ($ 365) Dollars. The doctors' testimony indicates treatment should be continued for an indefinite period of time, to be discontinued, however, if such treatments do not produce reasonable results within a reasonable time. The testimony discloses that his injuries are permanent and that he will continue to suffer indefinitely.
Courts in general are reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated, and there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty. This is particularly significant with respect to damages in tort actions for personal injuries. Armit v. Loveland, 3 Cir., 115 F.2d 308, 314. However, it may be expressed by a court, summarized, the rule is that, the trial judge will not interfere with a jury's verdict simply because it is greater than his own estimate; only where the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court and clearly manifest that it was the result of caprice, passion, partiality, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motives, will the court intervene. In determining whether a verdict is excessive it must be remembered that the maximum amount which a jury might properly award as damages under the evidence in a personal injury case cannot be determined with any degree of certainty, and must be largely a matter of judgment; the view most favorable to the plaintiff must be inferred from the evidence, and if there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict it will not be disturbed. Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 17.
It may be that if I had tried this case without a jury I would have rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in a lesser amount than that returned by the jury, but I cannot say that the verdict of the jury is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of the court, or clearly manifest that it was the result of caprice, passion, partiality, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motives.
For the foregoing reasons the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, and the motion for a new trial will be denied. Order accordingly may be submitted.