and particularize them. If the matter which thus comes into the pleading contains nothing more relevant to the charge of conspiracy on the part of the Railroad Company than is now asserted in the complaint, the suit should be dismissed as to The Pennsylvania Railroad Company insofar as any claim asserted by Mrs. Picking is concerned. A like ruling will be appropriate as to any claim asserted by Guy W. Picking against the Railroad Company if it shall appear that he was arrested under a governor's warrant valid on its face. * * *
'The warrant for Mrs. Picking, however, is valid upon its face and is not invalidated at least insofar as the corporate defendant is concerned by reason of the apparent discrepancy between the date of issuance of the warrant and the date of its execution.
'It is well established that a common carrier by railroad is required to accept for transportation as passengers persons in the custody of peace officers under a warrant valid on its face and that a common carrier refusing to accept such a person for transportation is liable for a penalty. (Cases cited). * * * If upon remand the governor's warrant for Guy W. Picking is made a part of the record and is similar in tenor to the governor's warrant issued for the arrest of Ida M. Picking, it will constitute a valid defense under the Railroad Company's present motion to the specific charge of illegal transportation.'
I have cited portions of the opinion at length because of the peculiar nature of this case and the parties involved and because I intend to confine my decision to the issues.
As to the first cause of action I find from the exhibit attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint that the governor's warrant issued for the arrest of Guy W. Picking is identical in form with that issued for the arrest of Ida M. Picking. To find whether it is alleged that the defendant did 'more than transport the plaintiffs form Harrisburg to New York City' I refer to the amended complaint. Three paragraphs, 160, 161, and 162, refer to the part the defendant is alleged to have taken in the conspiracy. Paragraph 160 alleges only that the defendant 'unlawfully conspired * * * to transport Plaintiffs without authority of law in Interstate Commerce' which adds nothing to the allegations contained in the original complaint. Paragraph 161 reiterates the alleged illegal transportation and adds an allegation that the defendant took, 'by its agents, a brakeman and a conductor, on said train, a money bribe from defendant, Mary Graham, for said illegal transportation.' The Circuit Court of Appeals has said that the warrant of removal of Ida M. Picking was valid on its face as to the defendant and that in fact the defendant was legally bound to accept her on that ground. So the alleged bribe cannot be held to be part of a conspiracy when the act of so accepting plaintiffs for transportation was required by law and refusal by a common carrier so to act imposes liability for a penalty. Paragraph 162 contains the allegation that an unknown brakeman 'violently pushed plaintiff, Ida M. Picking, * * * upon the iron steps of the train coach causing her to fall and further injure herself about the hands, arms and knees.' This averment likewise in no way enlarges the allegations of the conspiracy, nor does it charge the defendant Company with any participation therein. At the most, it is an allegation of a separate and distinct tort by the employees of the defendant Company and a cause of action outlawed by the Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations, Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 236, Sec. 2, 12 P.S. § 34. Such an additional cause of action cannot be introduced after the running of the Statute. Cox v. Wilkes Barre R. Corp. 334 Pa. 568, 6 A.2d 538; Hartley v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 318 Pa. 566, 179 A. 440; Commercial Credit Co. v. County of Northumberland, D.C., 23 F.Supp. 747.
As to the third cause of action a similar situation exists. The two warrants being identical, there can be no charge of illegal transportation and as discussed above the allegations as to a bribe and a tort by an employee of the defendant, do not in any way contain anything 'more relevant to the charge of conspiracy on the part of the Railroad Company' than has already been asserted in the complaint.
The motion of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to dismiss the complaint is granted and it is ordered that the action be, and hereby is, dismissed as to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
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