U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834, that no principle of law or provision of the Constitution precludes Congress from making criminal the violation of an administrative regulation.
It has been argued by counsel for the defendants that no mention is made in the War Powers Act of food stuffs or rationing, and by inference sugar is not a material such as would be governed by said Act, and that it is only used in connection with food stuffs or articles used for human consumption.
The Court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that sugar has many uses other than for food purposes; in its raw material form it could be held similar to grain or agricultural commodities which are used for the manufacture of many materials which were found vital to the successful prosecution of the war effort. Sugar was vitally needed to produce industrial alcohol which enters directly or indirectly into the manufacture of gases, pharmaceutical supplies, medicines, chemical warfare equipment, varnishes, paints, artificial leather, anti-freeze solution, explosives, moving picture films, inks, tobacco, lacquer, anesthetics, antiseptics, synthetic rubber products, and many other products which, beyond question, were vital to the war effort.
Material is generally defined as any substance or matter of which anything is made or may be made. 39 Corpus Juris, 1385.
There remains, therefore, no question in my mind but what sugar was such a material that would fall within the word 'material' in the War Powers Act. The fact that sugar was also used as a food and in the preparation of food stuffs would not in any sense of the word remove the interpretation of the use of sugar as a material in industry for the production of goods or warfare supplies and equipment.
Executive orders and legislation during a national emergency and in time of war must be expressed in broad terms and generalities, and in the interpretation of such legislation, the Court must not hunt for limitations nor scrutinize the wording with confining intent, but should seek for the purpose and spirit of the enactment. I, therefore, believe that the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration had power to ration sugar by virtue of the Second War Powers Act of 1942 since it was a material of vital importance. That in addition thereto, authority existed to prescribe by general orders or regulations criminal penalties for violation of regulations promulgated in connection therewith.
In connection with the legal sufficiency of the indictments in which it is contended that vagueness and indefiniteness exist as to the violation or violations complained of, the test of the indictments is whether they sufficiently charge the defendants with an offense so that they can know with what they are charged, and whether it is sufficiently specific so that conviction will bar a second prosecution for the same offense. Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. et al. v. United States, 6 Cir., 153 F.2d 353.
In order to determine whether an indictment charges an offense against the United States, designation by the pleader of the statute under which he purported to lay the charge is immaterial. The District Attorney may have conceived the charge under one statute which would not sustain the indictment but it may nevertheless come within the terms of another statute. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788; Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 389, 18 S. Ct. 92, 42 L. Ed. 509; United States v. Kolodny, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 210.
In connection with all of the indictments, I believe that the charges are laid out with sufficient definiteness for each of the defendants to know the offenses for which he stands charged and against which he must defend.
If any of the defendants do not have enough information or understanding in order to prepare their defense, they could avail themselves of a Bill of Particulars but the defendants are not entitled to a Bill of Particulars as to the specific wording of the regulations involved since a Bill of Particulars is to secure facts not legal theories. Kampe v. United States, 8 Cir., 151 F.2d 680; Rose v. United States, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 755.
Each of the motions to quash the indictments in connection with all of the above cases is, therefore, refused.
In addition to the above matters and in connection with the form indictment returned against James Vellis, Criminal Action Nos. 12217 and 12236, it is contended by counsel for said defendant that said indictment does not set forth facts which would prove James Vellis to be a party to the whole of said conspiracy set forth in said indictment. I do not believe this position to be well maintained since a single conspiracy may embrace several crimes, and the commission of an overt act in the furtherance of any one or more of the several crimes will suffice. United States v. Todaro, 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 977.
The motion of the defendant to quash said indictment, and any similar indictments against any of the defendants involved in the matter before the Court, for the reason just given is refused.
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