case. There is no charge, except in the general allegations of the indictment, that this defendant was either a party to or had knowledge of the other criminal ventures embraced within the alleged conspiracy. It is, in fact, admitted by the government in its answer that the 'defendant Moore (was) not known to have participated further in any matter with the defendants in this indictment after January 1939, or to have had any knowledge of such matters.' (Emphasis by the Court).
The defendant Moore may have conspired with the other defendants, as the indictment avers, to 'obstruct and impede the due administration of justice' in the Williamsport Wire Rope Company case. This, however, would not make him a party to the general conspiracy in the absence of a conscious participation in the general conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 208, 61 S. Ct. 204, 85 L. Ed. 128; United States v. Lekacos, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 170, 172, 173; United States v. Andolschek, 2 Cir., 142 F.2d 503, 507.
The statement of Judge Learned Hand in the last case, at page 507, of 142 F.2d, seems apposite. It was there stated: 'It is true that at times courts have spoken as though, if A. makes a criminal agreement with B., he becomes a party to any conspiracy into which B. may enter, or may have entered, with third persons. That is of course an error: the scope of the agreement actually made always measures the conspiracy, and the fact that B. engages in a conspiracy with others is as irrelevant as that he engages in any other crime. It is true that a party to a conspiracy need not know the identity, or even the number, of his confederates; when he embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them. Nevertheless, he must be aware of those purposes, must accept them and their implications, if he is to be charged with what others may do in execution of them.'
We may assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that the defendant Moore conspired with several of the other defendants to obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in the said case, as charged in the indictment. But, it is our opinion that this conspiracy, embraced within the general conspiracy, was as to him an independent criminal venture. It is apparent upon the face of the record before the Court that the last act in furtherance of this conspiracy was committed in January of 1939. It necessarily follows that prosecution as to the said defendant is barred by the statute of limitations.
The plea in bar is sustained and the motion to dismiss the indictment is granted.