fasten upon him a duty: that, if this question is answered in the affirmative, he is a necessary party."
Clearly in the situation here presented "* * * final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest (of the Secretary) * * *" as stated in Shields v. Barrow, supra, or "* * * so as to obtain from him a benefit, or to fasten upon him a duty * * *" as stated by Calvert. The rule enunciated in Shields v. Barrow was cited with approval in Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 1920, 254 U.S. 77, 80, 41 S. Ct. 39, 65 L. Ed. 145.
Only the Secretary could recall his determination of the plaintiff as a "national" and "unblock" his account. Even if the injunction which the plaintiff seeks were granted exactly as prayed in the complaint, no benefit would result to him. The defendant could continue its present activity without being guilty of any violation, for the defendant did not, and could not, "block" plaintiff's account, nor order his local bank to refuse to pay over any moneys to him without a license, nor require him to submit reports; these are merely actions of the Secretary of which the Reserve Bank advised the plaintiff. Furthermore, if plaintiff or the local bank violated an order, the Reserve Bank could do nothing except notify the Secretary.
Obviously an order by this court to the Reserve Bank to "unblock" plaintiff's account would be a futility. It would not benefit the plaintiff and the law is well-settled that "if an injunction can accomplish nothing, it should not issue". Withington v. Roberts & Co., D.C., 22 F.Supp. 460, 461. An injunction against the defendant here would certainly not vacate the order of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Taking into account all these factors, it is evident, therefore, that the motion to dismiss the complaint on the score that the Secretary of the Treasury is an indispensable party must be granted.
Inasmuch as the Secretary of the Treasury, like other heads of executive departments of the United States, may be sued only in the District of Columbia, the place of his official residence ( Butterworth v. Hill, 1885, 114 U.S. 128, 5 S. Ct. 796, 29 L. Ed. 119; Ernest v. Fleissner, supra; Scientific Manufacturing Co. v. Walker, D.C.M.D.Pa.1941, 40 F.Supp. 465; Jewel Productions v. Morgenthau, 2 Cir., 1938, 100 F.2d 390, 391, he cannot be made a party in this jurisdiction.
This conclusion makes academic the second point raised in the motion to dismiss, that is, that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy under Rules and Regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, providing for appeal. However, it must be stated that this point is well taken by the defendant and would of itself warrant a dismissal of the complaint.
Briefly stated, the plaintiff contends that the General Ruling No. 13 providing for a departmental review is not a substitute for rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. However, defendant does not contend that the appeal procedure provided by General Ruling No. 13 is a substitute for judicial review. It asserts, however, and properly so, that judicial review may not be had until the remedies prescribed by General Ruling No. 13 have been exhausted. The Secretary of the Treasury has provided a means whereby an administrative review may be had of his action, with full opportunity for hearing. It is a "* * * long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial review for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51, 58 S. Ct. 459, 463, 82 L. Ed. 638.
In Aron v. Federal Trade Commission, D.C., 50 F.Supp. 289, I discussed at length the numerous cases sustaining the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedy before recourse can be had to the courts and reference is made to that opinion.
Here the plaintiff has made no attempt to explore the administrative remedy which is available to him and that failure is fatal to his present action.
For the reasons above stated, the motion to dismiss must be granted.
An order may be submitted in accordance with this opinion.