We therefore conclude that the attitude which the defendant manifested during the years subsequent to his naturalization in connection with the German-American Bund reflected his true feelings, not only during the period of naturalization, but the five years preceding thereto.
This conclusion is supported by an opinion of Judge Watkins in United States v. Jogwick, D.C., August 24, 1943, 51 F.Supp. 2, 3, in which he says: "* * * But it is well settled law that the state of a person's mind on a given date may be proved by his subsequent actions and statements." See United States v. Baumgartner, D.C., 47 F.Supp. 622; United States v. Bergmann, D.C., 47 F.Supp. 765; United States v. Kuhn, D.C., 49 F.Supp. 407; United States v. Schuchhardt, D.C., 49 F.Supp. 567; United States v. Wezel, D.C., 49 F.Supp. 16; United States v. Meyer, D.C., 48 F.Supp. 926; United States v. Murray, D.C., 48 F.Supp. 920.
To my mind, the Government has proved by "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence that defendant was not attached to the principles of our Constitution when he was naturalized.
Judge Bryant of the Northern District of New York, in United States v. Haas et al., 51 F.Supp. 910, 911, in an opinion filed September 24, 1943, has well stated the situation applicable to persons who are adherents to the German Reich in relation to their attachment to the form of government in this country: "The ideologies of the two countries were opposite. The political philosophy of the two governments was absolutely inconsistent one with the other. No person could be attached to both forms of government. If attached to the principles of one he could not be a loyal adherent to the other."
Defendant cites the case of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 1343, 87 L. Ed. 1796, decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 21, 1943, as supporting his contention that the Government has not proved his lack of attachment to the Constitution of the United States. We do not think it does. Mr. Justice Murphy, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, has this to say as to the test to be applied in determining whether or not a person is attached to the principles of the Constitution:
"Our concern is with what Congress meant to be the extent of the area of allowable thought under the statute. By the very generality of the terms employed it is evident that Congress intended an elastic test, one which should not be circumscribed by attempts at precise definition. In view of our tradition of freedom of thought, it is not to be presumed that Congress in the Act of 1906, or its predecessors of 1795 and 1802, intended to offer naturalization only to those whose political views coincide with those considered best by the founders in 1787 or by the majority in this country today. Especially is this so since the language used, posing the general test of 'attachment' is not necessarily susceptible of so repressive a construction. The Government agrees that an alien 'may think that the laws and the Constitution should be amended in some or many respects' and still be attached to the principles of the Constitution within the meaning of the statute. Without discussing the nature and extent of those permissible changes, the Government insists that an alien must believe in and sincerely adhere to the 'general political philosophy' of the Constitution. Petitioner is said to be opposed to that 'political philosophy', the minimum requirements of which are set forth in the margin. It was argued at the bar that since Article V contains no limitations, a person can be attached to the Constitution no matter how extensive the changes are that the desires, so long as he seeks to achieve his ends within the framework of Article V. But we need not consider the validity of this extreme position for if the Government's construction is accepted, it has not carried its burden of proof even under its own test.
"The district court did not state in its findings what principles held by petitioner or by the Communist Party were opposed to the Constitution and indicated lack of attachment. See Note 6, ante. In its opinion that court merely relied upon In re Saralieff, D.C., 59 F.2d 436, and United States v. Tapolcsanyi, 3 Cir., 40 F.2d 255, without fresh examination of the question in the light of the present record. 33 F.Supp. 510. The Circuit Court of Appeals deduced as Party principles roughly the same ones which the Government here presses and stated 'these views are not those of our Constitution.' [9 Cir.], 119 F.2d , at pages 503, 504."
Whereupon the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.
In the instant case, we believe our findings of fact clearly demonstrate that Wolter was not attached to the principles of our Constitution, and that he, as one who believed in National Socialism as taught, advocated and practised by the Bund and the Nazi Party, has denied, and would abrogate the basic rights such as are guaranteed by our Bill of Rights, and proposes to abolish such rights whenever that party does attain power. A person with such beliefs cannot be attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, because National Socialism, as taught and advocated by the Bund and the Nazi Party, demands of its adherents primary allegiance to Germany, regardless of citizenship which the individual may have acquired elsewhere. An adherent of National Socialism cannot, in good faith, renounce absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to the German Reich, nor can an adherent of National Socialism take the oath of allegiance to the United States without a mental reservation.
An order for judgment in accordance with this opinion and our findings of fact and conclusions of law filed herewith, may be submitted by counsel for plaintiff on notice to counsel for defendant.
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