I have been unable to find any reported decisions in Pennsylvania construing this Act which cover that point. The decisions elsewhere are quite uniform in holding that the service under the circumstances of this case is improper.
In Morris & Co. et al. v. Skandinavia Insurance Co., 279 U.S. 405, at pages 408, 409, 49 S. Ct. 360, at page 361, 73 L. Ed. 762, the court said: "The purpose of state statutes requiring the appointment by foreign corporations of agents upon whom process may be served is primarily to subject them to the jurisdiction of local courts in controversies growing out of transactions within the state. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 18, 21, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345; Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115, 130, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492; Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck [Const.] Co., 257 U.S. 213, 215, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711. The language of the appointment and of the statute under which it was made plainly implies that the scope of the agency is intended to be so limited. By the terms of both, the authority continues only so long as any liability of the company remains outstanding in Mississippi. No decision of the state Supreme Court supports the construction for which petitioner contends. And, in the absence of language compelling it, such a statute ought not to be construed to impose upon the courts of the state the duty, or to give them power, to take cases arising out of transactions so foreign to its interests. The service of the summons cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Construction Co., 257 U.S. 213, at pages 215, 216, 42 S. Ct. 84, at page 85, 66 L. Ed. 201, Mr. Justice Holmes declared: "The purpose in requiring the appointment of such an agent is primarily to secure local jurisdiction in respect of business transacted within the State. Of course when a foreign corporation appoints one as required by statute it takes the risk of the construction that will be put upon the statute and the scope of the agency by the State Court. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610. But the reasons for a limited interpretation of a compulsory assent are hardly less strong when the assent is expressed by the appointment of an agent than when it is implied from going into business in the State without appointing one. In the latter case the implication is limited to business transacted within the State. Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 131, 132, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492; Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22, 23, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345. Unless the state law either expressly or by local construction gives to the appointment a larger scope, we should not construe it to extend to suits in respect of business transacted by the foreign corporation elsewhere, at least if begun, as this was, when the long previous appointment of the agent is the only ground for imputing to the defendant an even technical presence. Chipman, Ltd., v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 40 S. Ct. 172, 64 L. Ed. 314. The indications of the Ohio Statutes, so far as they go, look to 'liability incurred within this State.' Gen.Code § 181. As we know of no decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court of Ohio, we are of opinion that the service upon Nash was bad." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., Inc., 257 U.S. 533, at pages 535, 536, 42 S. Ct. 210, at page 211, 66 L. Ed. 354, Chief Justice Taft said: "Still less is it incumbent upon a state in furnishing such process to make the jurisdiction over the foreign corporation wide enough to include the adjudication of transitory actions not arising in the state. Indeed, so clear is this that in dealing with statutes providing for service upon foreign corporations doing business in the state upon agents whose designation as such is especially required, this court has indicated a leaning toward a construction, where possible, that would exclude from their operation causes of action not arising in the business done by them in the state. Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Construction Co., * * * 257 U.S. 213, 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L. Ed. 201; Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. , 22, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345; Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 130, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Minver v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, D.C., 16 F.Supp. 930, at page 931, the court said: "Thus far the highest court in California has given to this legislation no construction which authorizes, service of process upon the statutory agent of the foreign corporation defendant where the suit is founded upon a cause of action in no way connected with business transacted within this state. In the absence of any such interpretation, the decisions above mentioned, rendered by the highest court in the land, require in this instance that the California law authorizing service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business within the state be construed so as to exclude from the operation thereof suits founded upon causes of action not arising in the business done by such foreign corporation in this state. " (Emphasis supplied.)
For the reasons stated the motion to set aside service of summons is sustained and the complaint is dismissed.