agreement entered into between myself and the Barnes Foundation." The "above agreement" obviously refers to the contents of the letter rather than to any prior verbal agreement, the terms and conditions of which were not specified in the letter. The content and form of the letter and the inclusion of the subscript, which was signed by plaintiff and duly witnessed, is utterly inconsistent with the contention that it was intended merely as an acknowledgment that a verbal agreement, containing terms and conditions other than those specified in the letter, had been entered into by the parties. Under these circumstances, the letter constitutes the sole agreement between the parties, and prior oral arrangements or negotiations as to matters related to the subject of the written agreement may not be considered. Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791.
The same principles likewise answer defendant's argument that the change of the compensation of $6,000 to $8,000, despite the identity of the original and the redrafted letter in all other respects, establishes that some additional obligation must have been undertaken by plaintiff orally in consideration therefor. Assuming this to be the fact, it has no materiality as a matter of law since the parties did not so provide when they subsequently executed a written agreement on the subject.
Defendant further urges that in no event can a summary judgment be entered because the amount of damages is incapable of ascertainment on the present state of the record. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, however, that "the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the amount of damagas, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The issue as to the amount of damages need not therefore be considered in determining whether a summary judgment should be entered. Since the only other issues raised by defendant's answer are the existence of an oral agreement and the violation of certain of its terms and conditions, and since any such oral agreement was rendered immaterial as a matter of law by the subsequent execution of a written agreement between the parties on the subject, defendant has raised no genuine issue as to any material fact and plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
There remains the question whether damages may be presently ascertained and assessed or whether a trial on the issue of damages should be ordered in accordance with the procedure set forth in Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant argues that the amount of damages cannot be ascertained on the present state of the record because in the case of anticipatory breach of a contract of employment by an employer he is entitled to a credit to the extent of the prospective earnings of the discharged employee during the unexpired balance of the contract, and there is presently no evidence before the court on this question.
Plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that he is presently entitled to the $24,000 which he would have received for his services during the remaining three years of his contract with the defendant, because as a matter of law he may recover the full amount of the compensation he would have received had the contract not been broken. The very authorities cited by plaintiff, however, refute this contention and rule that credit must be given for any sums which the employee has earned following his discharge and which he might thereafter earn during the unexpired term of the contract. Pierce v. Tennessee C., I. & R.R. Co., 173 U.S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 335, 43 L. Ed. 591; Semet-Solway Co. v. Wilcox, 3 Cir., 143 F. 839, certiorari denied 202 U.S. 617, 26 S. Ct. 764, 50 L. Ed. 1173. See also Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 338.
Plaintiff further urges, however, that since under his contract with the defendant he was required to lecture only once a week at defendant's institution, and was therefore free to seek employment elsewhere provided it did not interfere with this duty, his prospective earnings need not in any event be deducted from the damages to which he is entitled. This argument cannot be sustained because the present record does not permit of a fair determination of the extent to which plaintiff's duties under his contract would have permitted him to obtain other employment. A trial must therefore be held on the question of damages.
Judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff against the defendant and it is ordered that the case proceed to trial for the determination of the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.