goods or services * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently plaintiffs have misconstrued the statement (page 500 of 310 U.S., page 996 of 60 S. Ct., 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044, supra): "Labor cases apart, which will presently be discussed, this Court has not departed from the conception of the Sherman Act as affording a remedy, public and private, for the public wrongs which flow from restraints of trade in the common law sense of restriction or suppression of commercial competition." (Emphasis supplied.)
The reason the Supreme Court makes this remark is that labor combinations might have a tendency to increase consumer prices, etc., and that the Sherman Act could be and was construed to cover them; the Clayton Act was enacted to clarify or remedy the situation for, as the Court says (pages 502, 503 of 310 U.S., page 997 of 60 S. Ct., 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044):
"A combination of employees necessarily restrains competition among themselves in the sale of their services to the employer; yet such a combination was not considered an illegal restraint of trade at common law when the Sherman Act was adopted, either because it was not thought to be unreasonable or because it was not deemed a 'restraint of trade.' Since the enactment of the declaration in § 6 of the Clayton Act [ 15 U.S.C.A. § 17] that 'the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce * * * nor shall such (labor) organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws', it would seem plain that restraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail the competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act."
Plaintiffs further attempt to distinguish the instant case on the ground that no legitimate labor objective is being sought by the Union's acts, and hence the interference with interstate commerce is direct and fundamental as distinguished from incidental. Again, assuming this to be so, there is no such distinction made by the Apex Hosiery Co. case, nor do the principles enunciated lend themselves to such distinction. In United States v. Hutcheson, supra, the Court said (page 232 of 312 U.S., page 466 of 61 S. Ct., 85 L. Ed. 788):
"So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means."
Of course, I am not passing here upon the question as to whether the plaintiffs can pursue other remedies. In this connection the following quotation from Swartz v. Forward Association, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 294, 296, is particularly appropriate. In that case the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to destroy his interstate business by a boycott.The court said:
"Reading the bill as a whole, there are no facts alleged which would bring the activities of the defendants within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. The injury complained of is a private wrong which we assume is remedial in some other court."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the plaintiffs have suffered a private injury. It is just as clear that they have failed to establish that there was prejudice to the public interest by undue restraint of competition or undue obstruction of the course of trade. As was stated in Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359, 53 S. Ct. 471, 474, 77 L. Ed. 825, 829:
"There is no question as to the test to be applied in determining the legality of the defendants' conduct. The purpose of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic endeavor."
For the reasons stated I have come to the conclusion that the Complaint must be dismissed.
Accordingly, I state the following
Conclusions of Law.
1. The acts complained of do not constitute a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., as amended by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq.
2. The plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed.
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