with this interpretation of the statute. In our opinion, this section means that if any person has engaged in any acts or practices "which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of Section 4 of this Act", he will be subject to an injunction. Section 4 makes many "acts or practices" unlawful; and hence the use of the plural in referring to them in Section 205(a). It does not mean that there must be more than one violation of any one of these prohibited acts or practices. It does mean that when a person has engaged, or is about to engage, in any of the acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provisions of Section 4 of the Act, he may be enjoined under the provisions of Section 205(a).
Even if it were a debatable question, -- which I do not consider it to be -- that doubt would be resolved against the contention of the defendant by 1 U.S.C.A., § 1, which provides: "* * * In determining the meaning of any Act or resolution of Congress, words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the plural number may include the singular; * * *" We therefore conclude that this point made by defendant is without merit.
The next point made by defendant is that the supporting affidavits offered by plaintiff on its motion for an injunction, do not show that the scrap contained in Milwaukee Car 360020 did not meet the invoice classification on its delivery to defendant. With this contention we cannot agree. The affidavits supporting the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction show that this car of scrap was rejected in part by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at Johnstown, Penn'a, because it was not up to classification of No. 1 steel scrap; that this car with its rejected contents was shipped by M. Glosser & Sons to the Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation and invoiced to that corporation as No. 1 heavy melting steel, and was paid for by defendant on that basis.
The Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation has filed no answer, but its motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 is accompanied by the affidavit of Glenn E. Hilliard, Open Hearth Superintendent of the Brackenridge plant of defendant, who states that the records of the defendant show that this particular car was received and unloaded by defendant; that he has no personal knowledge of the contents of the car; but that he had notified each Stock Yard Foreman of defendant not to unload any scrap which did not meet invoice classification.
This motion is also accompanied by affidavit of James B. Finley, Stock Yard Foreman, who states that it is his duty to inspect all open hearth scrap which is received while he is on the job, to see if it meets the invoice classification; that the company-records show that he was on duty when this Milwaukee Car No. 360020 was unloaded, but that he has no personal recollection of the contents of that car, although he feels certain that if the car had not met the invoice classification, he would not have permitted it to be unloaded.
Although no answer has been filed, it would appear from the supporting and opposing affidavits, that there is a genuine issue of fact as to what class of scrap was in this car when the Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corporation received it.
We therefore cannot enter summary judgment under Rule 56, because of the provision of Subdivision (c) thereof stating that such a judgment can be entered only when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact".
The motion for summary judgment will be denied, and defendant Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corporation will be allowed twenty days to answer the complaint.
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