Control Act and the provisions of Revised Price Schedule No. 4. In other words, by withholding payment of the $1,111.55 in its letter of June 23, 1942, the Jones & Laughlin Corporation intended to re-assert to the Glosser firm its intention and purpose not to pay the invoice price of $20.00 per ton for the scrap contained in the two cars aforesaid, and to pay instead only such lower price as should be permissible under the law. The Glosser firm had theretofore acquiesced in this position, and when David Glosser appeared as a witness for the plaintiff at the trial of this case, he stated that his firm would be obliged to accept any such adjustment. The said sum of $1,111.55 so withheld has never been paid.
14. When it accepted and used the scrap contained in the two cars, in spite of its inferiority to the grade of scrap described in the invoices, and without first communicating its complaint to the Glosser firm, the Jones & Laughlin Corporation followed a practice which has not been uncommon during the year 1942, under like circumstances at its plant, and at the plants of other steel companies such as the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. In its determination to withhold payment of a sufficient portion of the invoice-price to force an adjustment by the Glosser firm, the Jones & Laughlin Corporation conformed to a practice which is permitted by law (See Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543, Section 69, 69 P.S. § 314). By appearing in the transaction as a broker (and not as a principal) and claiming the broker's commission of 50( per ton in its invoices for the two cars, the Glosser firm guaranteed the quality of the scrap contained in the two cars (see Section 1034.6 of Revised Price Schedule No. 4; 7 Federal Register 1207).
15. In its acceptance and use of the two carloads of scrap, and its dealings with the Glosser firm with regard thereto, the Jones & Laughlin Corporation intended at all times to avoid any violation of the Emergency Price Control Act; and there is nothing in the evidence which can justify the conclusion that an injunction against the Jones & Laughlin Corporation is necessary either to correct or punish any past violation or to prevent any future violation of the law.
Conclusions of Law
(1) This court has jurisdiction of this proceeding under the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
(2) Under the provisions of Revised Price Schedule No. 4 which were in effect throughout the month of March, 1942, (7 Federal Register 1206) the maximum base price payable in Pittsburgh for scrap iron and steel of the quality contained in Cars P&LE 46905 and B&O 259038 was $15 per ton.
(3) Under the provisions of Revised Price Schedule No. 4, which were in effect throughout the month of March, 1942, defendants M. Glosser & Sons, as brokers, guaranteed the quality of the scrap delivered by them to the Jones & Laughlin Corporation in cars P&LE 46905 and B&O 259038 to be of the quality of that designated on the accompanying invoices, towit: heavy melting steel scrap.
(4) Upon delivery to it of the two carloads of scrap of a quality less than that so guaranteed to it as aforesaid, the defendant Jones & Laughlin Corporation had the lawful right to accept, keep and use the scrap, and at any time thereafter to set off in any accounting between it and the defendants M. Glosser & Sons, in diminution of the purchase price, such sum (in this instance the sum of $5.00 per ton) as was necessary to reduce the invoice price of the scrap aforesaid to the maximum lawful price thereof.
(5) The defendant Jones & Laughlin Corporation has not thus far paid any portion of the purchase price of the two carloads of scrap aforesaid.
(6) The defendant Jones & Laughlin Corporation has not bought, offered to buy, or accepted delivery of, the iron and steel scrap contained in the cars aforesaid at prices higher than the maximum prices permitted under Revised Price Schedule No. 4; and with respect to said scrap it has committed no violation of the Emergency Price Control Act or of Revised Price Schedule No. 4.
(7) No injunction should be awarded against the defendant Jones & Laughlin Corporation, and as to it this suit should be dismissed.
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