Furthermore, the warehouse receipt had been pledged originally for all of the indebtedness of Limbert to plaintiff and that indebtedness never at any time was less than $20,000.
Defendant further contends that it should be discharged of its liability because the check which it delivered to the order of Limbert in payment for the converted beans was deposited to Limbert's account in the plaintiff bank. Plaintiff bank was not given the check for its own use but was merely an agent for collection, and the bank did not take the proceeds of the check but instead credited it to Limbert's account. There appears to be no merit in this argument.
Another contention of the defendant is that, since the balance due on the particular loan for which the warehouse receipt was given as collateral is $2,750, the plaintiff, in no event is entitled to recover the full value of the beans converted but the verdict must be restricted to $2,750. Defendant has cited a number of Pennsylvania cases for the proposition that the holder of collateral pledged for an antecedent indebtedness is not a purchaser for value. This principle of law has no application to the facts in the present case. When plaintiff received the warehouse receipt issued by a warehouseman for goods in his possession in the warehouse, it received as pledgee constructive possession of the beans and it was entitled under the agreement to all the beans pledged to secure the past, present and future indebtedness of Limbert. When these beans were subsequently purchased by the defendant, the latter acquired no other rights to the converted beans than Limbert had. The purchaser of property wrongfully converted acquires no other title than the seller had. McMahon v. Sloan, 12 Pa. 229, 51 Am.Dec. 601; Rice v. Yocum, 155 Pa. 538, 26 A. 698.
On December 14, 1940, the defendant filed a supplemental statement in support of its motion for a new trial, giving as a reason the fact that Thomas J. Bradley, a witness who testified for the plaintiff, wrote three letters which cast doubt upon the credibility of Bradley and upon the accuracy of his testimony in the instant case. One of the letters was sent on November 12, 1939, to A. Schilling & Company in San Francisco, California, who are defendants in another suit brought by plaintiff in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California to recover for the conversion of other vanilla beans. This letter explained that an attorney representing Schilling called upon Bradley with a view of having him testify for Schilling. The letter further stated that he could give information that would kill the case against them and in return for this information would appreciate obtaining a position with the Schilling firm. The other two letters are of a similar nature. These ltters were produced by counsel for Schilling at the taking of depositions on October 29, 1940, in connection with the California case. Without condoning the character of the letters, I am unable to perceive any reason justifying a new trial. Both Bradley and his sister, the bookkeeper of Limbert, testified from the books and records of Limbert and from these were able to trace the beans delivered to the defendant. After-discovered evidence having for its purpose only the impeachment of the credibility of witnesses furnishes no sufficient reason for a new trial, unless it clearly appears that harmful error occurred at the trial. Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 A. 351; Commonwealth v. Elliott, 292 Pa. 16, 140 A. 537; Peterman v. Enggasser, 280 Pa. 528, 124 A. 681; Commonwealth v. Carter, 272 Pa. 551, 116 A. 409.
The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and judgment thereon and to enter judgment for defendant in accordance with its motion for directed verdict and the defendant's motion for a new trial are both denied.
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