mills to be shipped into Allegheny County pursuant to the conspiracy described in this indictment. No other motive is stated in the indictment for the union requiring this clause in the Beaver County labor agreements. The same facts, it is alleged, also constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as indicated above.
The demurring defendants contend that this indictment is insufficient in law, because: (1) conclusions rather than facts are pleaded; (2) no restraint of interstate commerce is sufficiently alleged; and (3) the acts performed by the defendants, as set forth in the indictment, are exempted from the operation of the Sherman Act by reasons of Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 17, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52.
In our opinion, there is no merit in defendants' contention that conclusions, and not facts, are pleaded. The summary of facts pleaded as hereinbefore set forth, clearly establishes that the indictment pleads facts, and not conclusions. In our opinion, too, these facts sufficiently allege a conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce. The indictment alleges that defendants combined and conspired; that their purpose was directly to restrain interstate commerce by stopping millwork moving in such commerce by threats of refusal, and actually refusing to install such millwork after its arrival in Allegheny County; that such restraint was undue, unreasonable, and without justification; that the means employed included strikes, threats of strikes, intimidation, and coercion; that the motive for imposing this direct restraint on commerce was unworthy and illegal; and that these restraints were not only planned, but to a degree carried out.
This view is supported by Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488, 13 Ann.Cas. 815; Duplex printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196; United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169, 71 L. Ed. 403; Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, 54 A.L.R. 791; United States v. Painters District Council of Chicago, D.C., 44 F.2d 58, affirmed 284 U.S. 582, 52 S. Ct. 38, 73 L. Ed. 504.
As to the contention of the defendants that the acts complained of in the indictment are exempt from the operation of the Sherman Act by provisions 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, we regard this contention as without merit. Both the Government and the defendants rely on Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 178, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196, as sustaining their position. As we read this case, the Supreme Court held that the restrictions in the Clayton Act applied to acts committed by parties concerned in "a 'dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment.'" There is no dispute here concerning terms or condition of employment. Therefore, the Clayton Act does not apply.
We, therefore, conclude that the demurrers to the indictment must be overruled. An order may be submitted accordingly.
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