notice of danger of injury to school children who might be on the street. It further meant that he should have his car under control so that he would be able to bring his car to a stop in avoidance of the threatened danger to school children. It had no direct relation to the vehicular traffic on Reed Street, but it did mean that the stopping control for the one purpose would answer also for the other. The automobile was on the extreme West side of Third Street. This increased the danger of collision with vehicles moving on Reed Street. This brings us to a finding of where on Reed Street the collision occurred. We find it was on the North side of Reed Street near the North line and not on the South side where the testimony of the truck driver located it.
We have already found that the truck ran into the automobile, striking it on the rear and near the left rear wheel. We do not find that the traffic moving on Third Street had the right of way, but we have found and do find that the slow sign and the fact that the automobile was on the right of the truck driver, admonished him not to enter upon Third Street unless the crossing was clear. This admonition he did not heed. We have in consequence adjudged him to have been guilty of negligence. This however did not absolve the motorist from his duty to exercise due care.
We have already found that his duty was to have his car under such control as that he could by stopping avoid an impending collision. The fact that the danger was created by the negligence of the truck, did not relieve him. He had no such absolute right of way as that he could rely upon it, as in the case of a display of red and green signs. Did he negligently contribute to the collision? He testified that he had reduced his speed to the rate of eight or ten miles an hour. This, with watchfulness of the Reed Street traffic, would have justified the finding of due care on his part.
We are however unable to make this finding in his favor. He had a full view of the approaching truck for at least fifty feet before he reached the point of collision. We say this because of our finding that the place of collision was near the North line of Reed Street. Traveling at eight or ten miles per hour he could easily have stopped his car to avoid the collision at the expense only of surrendering the right of way. Instead of doing this he took the risk of passing in front of the truck. Whether he did this or whether he was traveling at such a rate of speed that he could not stop on fifty feet of notice, he was alike in fault. The course of the automobile after the collision might indicate a greater rate of speed than that to which he testified. It ran some distance beyond the North line of Reed Street, climbed the curb, crossed the side walk to the fence on the West side of Third Street, and then went back into Third Street to at least the car tracks and possibly to the East side of the Street before it came to a stop. The left rear wheel of the car was however flat and the driver may have been jostled from his control by the collision. The course of the car may in consequence have been very erratic so that no speed inference could be drawn from this. There is no evidence from which it may be found whether the motor was running after the collision.
Under all the evidence we make the finding that the plaintiff and defendant Harold Dranoff was guilty of negligence which contributed to bring about the collision and the consequent damages.
This takes us to the case of Rose Dranoff, who was a passenger in the automobile, and to her husband Charles. The Pennsylvania law rejects the English doctrine that a passenger is so far identified with the vehicle in which he is riding as to be answerable for its negligence, and holds the passenger only to his own negligence. The automobile belonged to the father Charles Cranoff. One of the uses to which he devoted it was the carrying of his employees, which included his son Harold, and his wife Rose, to and from his place of business. The son and wife were on their way home from their place of employment. Whoever drove the car was thus acting for the father. The fact situation thus was that the employees were going to their homes in the car which was being driven by the son as chauffeur of the father. This means he would be answerable for the negligence of the driver, and results in the wife alone having a cause of action.
There remains only the question of the damages sustained by her. Fortunately her damages were not great. We assess them at $300.
We find in favor of the defendants and against Charles Dranoff, and give judgment accordingly.
We find in favor of Rose Dranoff, one of the plaintiffs, and against Railway Express Agency, and Harold Dranoff, additional defendant, in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars, with costs.
Rose Dranoff should have judgment in her favor for Three Hundred Dollars, with costs of suit.
An appropriate judgment may be entered in accordance herewith.
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