The conditional sale contract here involved as filed in the prothonotary's office contained the following as its opening paragraph: "Know All Men by These Presents, That I, Bessie Rose, of 805 Sixty-Ninth Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as Buyer, do hereby acknowledge the receipt from Hannah Salkind, of 6634 Pine Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred to as Seller, certain machinery, apparatus, plant and equipment now upon premises 3306-16 E. Thompson Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, described in a schedule hereto annexed, made part hereof and referred to as Exhibit 'A.'"
The schedule of machinery and equipment therein stated to be annexed, made part thereof, and referred to as "Exhibit A," was, however, not annexed thereto or filed in the prothonotary's office. It is because of this omission that the trustee in bankruptcy contends that the conditional sale contract was not filed in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and was, therefore, void as to him. Whether this is so depends, we think, upon whether the paper as filed was a complete conditional sale contract, or whether it was only a portion of a contract from which a material part was omitted. If the latter, the filing of the part would not operate under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act to protect the title of the vendor. In re Bazemore (D.C.) 189 F. 236; In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co. (D.C.) 2 F.2d 750, 756. In our opinion the answer to this inquiry must be that a material part of the contract was omitted from the document as filed, and that its filing, therefore, does not furnish support for the reclamation petition. We reach this conclusion because the document filed shows on its face that it is incomplete, in that a part of it, the schedule containing the description of the machinery and equipment sold, is omitted. This obviously is a material part of the contract, and its omission is not cured by the brief general reference to the machinery and equipment sold contained in the portion of the contract above quoted, since that language is not sufficiently precise or definite, particularly in view of the testimony that other similar machinery and equipment was located upon the premises mentioned. We think that the word "certain," used in referring to the machinery and equipment in the part of the contract which we have quoted, followed as it is stated to be by a detailed description (which was not in fact attached), was used in the sense of "some among possible others." Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d Ed.) Unabridged, p. 440, definition 2b. As so interpreted the language referring to the machinery and equipment in the contract is too indefinite to constitute a sufficient reference to support the agreement. Regardless of this, however, the failure to include a schedule containing a description of the machinery and equipment sold, which schedule the contract itself expressly stipulates to be a part of it, in our opinion amounts to the omission of a material part of the contract. Meier & Frank Co. v. Sabin (C.C.A.) 214 F. 231. We need only add that the fact that the schedule may have been omitted from the filed copy by mistake and that it can be supplied by parol evidence does not affect the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, which can be affected by the filed copy only.