of citizens of the United States. DeGrazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S.W. 992, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059; In re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 P. 1056, 61 A.L.R. 337, and cases cited in notes.
That the effect of some of the regulations may be to favor domestic products or citizens of the state does not in itself render a state law obnoxious to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cox v. Texas, 202 U.S. 446, 26 S. Ct. 671, 50 L. Ed. 1099; Brown-Forman Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 30 S. Ct. 578, 54 L. Ed. 883; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Marketing Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 48 S. Ct. 291, 72 L. Ed. 473; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43, 45 L. Ed. 102.
A very illuminating discussion of this feature may be found in the dissenting opinion in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed. 929, 85 A.L.R. 699.
The conclusions reached are:
1. The Pennsylvania Act is a constitutional exercise of the power of the state to legislate on the subject of the importation of intoxicating liquor into the state.
2. The right demanded by the plaintiff is the right to import beer into the state of Pennsylvania "in violation of the law" of the state. This right the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Twenty-First Amendment deny and the importation is forbidden.
3. The bill of the plaintiff should be dismissed, with costs, as wanting in equity.
The California and Georgia Cases.
The like questions have been brought before other courts upon the rulings in which the plaintiff relies. A decent respect for the courts rendering these decisions calls for a statement of our reasons for reaching a different conclusion. The cases are Young's Market Company v. State Board, 12 F.Supp. 140, ruled by the District Court for the Southern District of California, a copy of the opinion in which has been supplied to us, and a like ruling by the court of the Georgia District, in which no opinion has been made public.
We are not advised of the provisions of the California statute (St.Cal. 1935, c. 330) and restrict ourselves to such expressions of the opinion as have application to the Pennsylvania Act. We accept, of course, the proposition that without the Wilson, Reed, and Webb-Kenyon Acts and the Twenty-First Amendment, any interruption of the free flow of beer into Pennsylvania in interstate commerce would be obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Constitution. No citation of authorities is needed to support this proposition. The opinion, however, so far as it applies to the instant case, is based upon a phrase in the Triner Corp. v. Arundel Case (D.C.) 11 F.Supp. 145, 147, to the effect that the Twenty-First Amendment does not withdraw intoxicating liquors as a subject of interstate commerce. The opinion hastens to add, however, that by it the states are "free to determine to what extent, if at all, intoxicating liquors" shall continue to be the lawful subject of such commerce. It may be that it is inaccurate to say that the Webb-Kenyon Act or the Twenty-First Amendment withdraws intoxicating liquor from the subjects of interstate commerce. Clearly neither does of itself because such liquors continue to be the subject of such commerce until the state has acted. As soon, however, as the importation is forbidden by a state law, the importation is forbidden by the Constitution and laws of the United States. In this respect intoxicating liquor is made an exception to other subjects of interstate commerce.
It is here that we find ourselves in disagreement with what we are asked to find in the opinion in the cited case. It is that any state law which interferes with the importation of intoxicating liquor into the state is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution and hence a nullity.
We adhere to the view, before expressed, that if it cannot be imported without a violation of a law of the state, its importation is declared unlawful by the Webb-Kenyon Act and by the Twenty-First Amendment, and it is hence without the operation of the commerce clause.
The state statutes in the cited cases were held to be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. We, of course, express no opinion as to this feature of those cases, but we hold that the Pennsylvania statute is not so in conflict.
In compliance with the Equity Rule formulated November 25, 1935 (rule 70 1/2, as amended [ 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723]), we file herewith findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The bill before us prays for an injunction against the enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute and also asks for a declaratory judgment.
To give definiteness of date to the decree entered, none is now made, but the parties have leave to submit a formal decree in conformity with this opinion.
Findings of Fact.
1. The facts are found as set forth in the stipulation of counsel.
Conclusions of Law.
1. The beer, the claimed right to import which the plaintiff asks to have enforced, cannot be imported except in violation of the laws of Pennsylvania.
2. The statutes of the state, here in question, are constitutional.
3. The importation is unlawful under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
4. The bill of the plaintiff is without equity and should be dismissed, with costs.
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