When the first injury was sustained, he was in the employ of the Independent Pier Company. When the second injury was received, he was in the employ of Murphy Cook & Co. After receipt of the first injury, he applied for a compensation, which was awarded to him by a former commissioner. There was a limitation in the time for which the compensation was awarded on the theory that the injury no longer continued. The injured workman asked to have the order made reopened, and it was found that the injury was a continuing one, and the compensation order was changed accordingly. This award was against the Independent Pier Company. The workman had entered the employ of Murphy Cook & Co. and was the victim of a second injury affecting the same parts of his body as that affected by the first injury. He made application for compensation in which an order was also entered.
In case No. 8807, which complains of the order made in the case originally heard by Commissioner Monahan, the objections to the order are: (1) That the commissioner was without authority of law to change the order entered by Commissioner Monahan, and that the order so made has become final, and (2) that the commissioner erred in his fact findings as to the duration of the injuries first sustained.
It has been repeatedly ruled that the court on a review does not reweigh the evidence before the commissioner in order to substitute its own findings for those the commissioner has made. This reduces the complaint to the one of whether the succeeding commissioner could reopen the proceedings had before his predecessor. The provisions of the original act, section 22, Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1437, subsequently amended (33 U.S.C.A. § 922), provides that at any time within a year the commissioner upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, may make a new compensation order in any case in which an order has been previously made. This would seem decisive of the question and calls for the dismissal of bill No. 8807.
Bill No. 8809 apparently re-raises precisely the same question and calls for a like ruling.
We do not have access to the orders made by the commissioner and may not have the correct idea of the record situation. As we understand it, however, the renewed hearing of the first order was pending when the second injury was received. There were in consequence the two proceedings before him. They were so interwoven in their facts that they were heard at the same hearings and each determined on the part of the evidence applicable to it.
As we further understand it, the commissioner found as a fact that the workman was suffering from a total disability and entitled to the full compensation permitted by the act. As his disability was due to the combined effect of the two injuries, the commissioner determined as a fact that each employer was answerable for one-half of the total injury, and made his awards accordingly. Complaint is made that the fact conclusions reached by the commissioner were erroneous.
We are in effect asked to review the evidence and substitute our own fact findings for those reached by the commissioner. This we are not called upon to do even if we should differ from the commissioner. More than this, the order against which bill No. 8809 is directed is an order against the Murphy Cook & Co. and not against the Independent Pier Company. It therefore follows that the latter company has no concern with this order.
Bill No. 8807, June term, 1935, is accordingly dismissed for want of equity, and bill No. 8809, June term, 1935, is likewise dismissed for the same reason.
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